征用
股东
索引(排版)
执行
数据库事务
多样性(控制论)
业务
股票市场指数
法律与经济学
交易成本
库存(枪支)
股票市场
商法
会计
法学
经济
金融经济学
精算学
公司治理
财务
政治学
机械工程
古生物学
马
人工智能
万维网
计算机科学
生物
程序设计语言
工程类
作者
Simeon Djankov,Rafael La Porta,Florencio López‐de‐Silanes,Andrei Shleifer
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.02.007
摘要
We present a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index. Assembled with the help of Lex Mundi law firms, the index is calculated for 72 countries based on legal rules prevailing in 2003, and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, that govern a specific self-dealing transaction. This theoretically grounded index predicts a variety of stock market outcomes, and generally works better than the previously introduced index of anti-director rights.
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