等级制度
公司治理
代理成本
业务
中国
代理(哲学)
会计
经验证据
样品(材料)
实证研究
委托代理问题
股东
财务
政治学
社会学
哲学
认识论
色谱法
化学
社会科学
法学
作者
Dongshan Ma,Jiayu Zhao,Shengqiang Zhang,Cui-Fang Wang
标识
DOI:10.1080/16081625.2022.2077778
摘要
ABSTRACTABSTRACTUsing a large sample of Chinese A-share listed firms during 2008–2017, this study investigates whether and how the informal hierarchy of independent directors affects two types of agency costs. We find that the informal hierarchy of independent directors is negatively correlated with the two types of agency costs and the negative effect is robust to alternative empirical designs. Moreover, our further research indicates that ownership structure matters for the performance of independent directors. We provide empirical evidence for optimizing the independent director team structure and improving corporate governance.KEYWORDS: Independent directorinformal hierarchyagency costownership structurecorporate governance Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by Liaoning social science planning fund [L19AGL001].
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