Environment management policy implementation for sustainable industrial production under power asymmetry in the graph model

In the wake of the Paris agreement, adaptation and mitigation efforts are underway to combat climate change. Despite the promulgation of environmental policies, rules and regulations, and the setting of local environmental regulations, the objectives of cleaner industrial production, and sustainable environmental management are still far from the targets set. However, the stringent implementation of environmental policy is equally important as the decree of environmental laws. Environmental conflicts between the government and industry may source from lenient or less strict policy implementation and/or weak administrative capacity of the governments’ agencies. The use of the government's inherent power can play a pivotal role in determining the preferences of the industry regarding environmental sustainability. This study proposes a power-asymmetric based negotiation strategy by incorporating formal mathematical formulations of the power-asymmetric preferences and stability concepts in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR). A case study of government-industry conflict is resolved to confirm the procedure and application of the proposed methodology. The analysis shows how the decision-maker – industry adjusts its preference when the government imposes strict environmental policy. It provides valuable strategic insights that use of government's inherent power in the stringent implementation of environmental policies is indispensable for cleaner industrial production and sustainable environmental management.