公司治理
投资(军事)
沉默
业务
投资决策
财务
经济
货币经济学
会计
行为经济学
法学
政治学
政治
美学
哲学
作者
Sudarshan Jayaraman,Joanna S. Wu
摘要
Mandatory disclosure provides benefits, but it also entails costs. One cost concerns managerial learning: by discouraging informed trading, disclosure could reduce managers’ ability to glean decision-relevant information from prices. Using mandatory segment reporting in the United States, we uncover a reduction in investment-$q$ sensitivity, indicating lower investment efficiency after regulation. Consistent with learning, lower sensitivity is concentrated in firms with more informed trading and lower financing constraints. Constrained firms exhibit no change in investment-$q$ sensitivity, suggesting that they enjoy countervailing benefits via greater financing and stronger governance. Overall, we document a novel link between mandatory disclosure and real effects. Received October 25, 2017; editorial decision June 20, 2018 by Editor Wei Jiang.
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