结果(博弈论)
可验证秘密共享
资产(计算机安全)
差异(会计)
通信源
经济
价值(数学)
金融经济学
金融市场
业务
微观经济学
精算学
货币经济学
财务
会计
计算机科学
集合(抽象数据类型)
电信
机器学习
程序设计语言
计算机安全
出处
期刊:Econometrica
[Wiley]
日期:2003-01-01
卷期号:71 (1): 105-133
被引量:231
标识
DOI:10.1111/1468-0262.00391
摘要
Public information in financial markets often arrives through the disclosures of interested parties who have a material interest in the reactions of the market to the new information. When the strategic interaction between the sender and the receiver is formalized as a disclosure game with verifiable reports, equilibrium prices can be given a simple characterization in terms of the concatenation of binomial pricing trees. There are a number of empirical implications. The theory predicts that the return variance following a poor disclosed outcome is higher than it would have been if the disclosed outcome were good. Also, when investors are risk averse, this leads to negative serial correlation of asset returns. Other points of contact with the empirical literature are discussed. Copyright The Econometric Society 2003.
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