The whistle‐blower effect vs. the cry‐wolf effect: A game analysis framework for collaborative epidemic information governance

Abstract The unpredictability of the epidemics caused by new, unknown viruses, combined with differing responsibilities among government departments, often leads to a prisoner's dilemma in epidemic information governance. In this context, the whistle‐blower effect in the health departments leads to delayed reporting to avoid potential retaliation, and the cry‐wolf effect in the administrative departments results in sustained observation to avoid ineffective warnings. To address these challenges, we employ game theory to analyze the dynamics of epidemic information governance and focus on two external governance mechanisms—superior accountability and media supervision—that can help resolve the prisoner's dilemma during and after an outbreak. Our analysis indicates that it is necessary to increase the strategic coordination of whistle‐blowers in the short‐term decision‐making during the outbreak. From a long‐term evolution perspective, maintaining optimal levels of superior accountability and media supervision is essential to overcoming the prisoner's dilemma. Media supervision works more slowly in the implement effectiveness than more direct superior accountability. This paper highlights the crucial roles of the whistle‐blower effect and the cry‐wolf effect in coordination failures of epidemic information governance during outbreaks of unknown viruses. It clarifies the strategic coordination pathways between expert systems and bureaucratic systems and emphasizes the importance of superior accountability and media supervision to enable effective, collaborative epidemic information governance.