Promoting low-carbon buildings investment behavior in carbon trading policies: a multi-player dynamic quantum game approach

Purpose This study aims to explore the improvement of low-carbon buildings (LCBs) supply’s efforts in LCBs investment within the context of carbon trading policy. Design/methodology/approach The dynamic quantum game method is employed for this study. Firstly, a classic game model between developers, contractors and the governments is established. Secondly, this study compares the game strategies and payoff matrix for the three parties under different stages. Subsequently, the “carbon benefit entanglement protocol” is designed, and the policy implications are discussed through practical data analysis. Findings The results show that in the case of quantum strategy and quantum entanglement, the government has the highest enthusiasm for LCBs in the initial stage. Developers and contractors chose to invest in LCBs in all four phases. The signing of the “carbon benefit entanglement protocol” enhances the entanglement level between developers and contractors, leading to mutual benefits and decreased regulatory burdens for the government. Originality/value The findings of this study not only propose a new dynamic game model but also provide sound recommendations for governments, developers and contractors to promote the rapid development of low-carbon transition in the construction industry.