中国
经济
分叉
经济地理学
政治学
法学
物理
非线性系统
量子力学
作者
Avner Greif,Guido Tabellini
标识
DOI:10.1257/aer.100.2.135
摘要
How to sustain cooperation is a key challenge for any society. Different social organizations have evolved in the course of history to cope with this challenge by relying on different combinations of external (formal and informal) enforcement institutions and intrinsic motivation. Some societies rely more on informal enforcement and moral obligations within their constituting groups. Others rely more on formal enforcement and general moral obligations towards society at large. How do culture and institutions interact in generating different evolutionary trajectories of societal organizations? Do contemporary attitudes, institutions, and behavior reflect distinct pre-modern trajectories? This paper addresses these questions by examining the bifurcation in the societal organizations of pre-modern China and Europe. It focuses on their distinct epitomizing social structures, the clan and the city, that sustain cooperation through different mixes of enforcement and intrinsic motivation. The Chinese clan is a kinship-based hierarchical organization in which strong moral ties and reputation among clan members are particularly important in sustaining cooperation. In Medieval Europe, by contrast, the main example of a cooperative organization is the city. Here cooperation is across kinship lines and external enforcement plays a bigger role. But morality and reputation,
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