激励
背景(考古学)
竞赛(生物学)
分配律
业务
数据共享
公共经济学
心理干预
经济
竞争优势
期限(时间)
产业组织
面板数据
控制(管理)
精算学
营销
会计
财务
知识共享
作者
Thomas Klebel,Federico Bianchi,Tony Ross‐Hellauer,Flaminio Squazzoni
出处
期刊:Research Policy
[Elsevier BV]
日期:2025-10-06
卷期号:54 (10): 105340-105340
被引量:2
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.respol.2025.105340
摘要
Although it is beneficial to scientific development, data sharing is still uncommon in many research areas. Various organisations, including funding agencies that endorse open science, are working to increase uptake. However, it is difficult to estimate the large-scale implications of different policy interventions on data sharing by funding agencies, especially in the context of intense competition among academics. In this study, we developed an agent-based simulation model to examine the impact of different funding schemes (e.g., highly competitive large grants versus distributive small grants), and the intensity of incentives on the uptake of data sharing by academic teams that adapt their strategy according to the context. Our results show that, in the short term, more competitive funding schemes may lead to higher rates of data sharing, but lower rates in the long term because the uncertainty associated with competitive funding negatively affects the cost/benefit ratio of data sharing. Conversely, more distributive grants imply a drastic reduction in initial uptake compared to more competitive funding schemes because they do not allow academic teams to cover the costs and time required for data sharing. However, they ensure higher long term uptake. Our findings suggest that any attempt to reform reward and recognition systems in line with open science principles must carefully consider the potential impact and long-term side effects of their proposed policies.
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