Auditor changes and management's issuance of earnings forecasts

Abstract Auditor changes are significant corporate events marking disruptions in the auditor‐client relationship. Prior studies have primarily examined the impact of such changes on audit quality and investment decisions of market participants. We study the effect of auditor changes on the voluntary disclosure of forward‐looking information. Managers may choose to reduce disclosure due to the possible adverse effect of the disruptions on disclosure credibility. Alternatively, shareholders may demand increased disclosure to intensify monitoring, as the auditor change signals potential issues between the company and the auditor. Employing multiple identification strategies, we find that firms are less likely to issue management earnings forecasts (MEFs) following auditor changes. We also find that governance quality mitigates the negative impact of auditor changes on the issuance of MEFs. Additionally, auditor changes are associated with lower market reactions to forecast releases. The overall evidence is consistent with the notion of reduced forecast credibility. Lastly, we conduct cross‐sectional analyses on characteristics of the auditor changes and find evidence consistent with signaling and anticipated successor audit quality to be underlying mechanisms for the association between auditor changes and MEFs. Our study provides the first large sample evidence that auditor changes have a disruptive effect on the voluntary disclosure of forward‐looking information.