议价能力
相互依存
供应链
产业组织
业务
功率(物理)
控制(管理)
任务(项目管理)
资源依赖理论
资源(消歧)
微观经济学
供应链管理
动作(物理)
经济
运营管理
营销
管理
计算机科学
社会学
计算机网络
社会科学
物理
量子力学
作者
T. Russell Crook,James G. Combs
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jom.2006.05.008
摘要
Abstract Research suggests that collaborative supply chain management (SCM) helps chain members create “a rising tide that lifts all boats.” Yet resource dependence theory suggests that when tides rise, some boats are lifted more than others; members who furnish important resources or resources where control is concentrated have bargaining power. Drawing on Thompson [Thompson, J.D., 1967. Organizations in Action. McGraw‐Hill, New York], we argue that strong firms’ bargaining power use is tempered by the type of coordination different types of task interdependencies demand. We also investigate how both strong and weak members benefit from SCM. Whereas strong members reap most of the direct benefits, weak members can often gain by building switching costs with strong members, leveraging SCM outside the focal chain, and increasing survival chances.
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