衡平法
自由裁量权
股东
股票资本市场
股权风险
业务
公司治理
激励
财务
库存(枪支)
会计
经济
私募股权
微观经济学
法学
政治学
机械工程
工程类
作者
Brian D. Cadman,Richard Carrizosa
标识
DOI:10.1111/1475-679x.12532
摘要
ABSTRACT Equity compensation is granted out of an equity incentive plan that must be approved by shareholders and cedes discretion over equity grants to boards of directors. We predict and find that equity plan proposals give boards more discretion over grants when the firm faces greater labor market forces and more volatile stock returns. When examining votes, we find that shareholders are less likely to support plans with abnormal discretion. We also find that boards with more discretion grant more equity in response to stock price declines. Lastly, we find that boards request additional shares when their ability to grant equity is more constrained by a smaller pool of available shares, and when they plan to increase equity grants. Overall our findings illuminate how firms balance needs to respond to labor market pressure and volatile operating environments against shareholder governance and oversight of equity compensation.
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