商誉
业务
斯塔克伯格竞赛
质量(理念)
产品(数学)
竞争优势
产业组织
市场份额
生产(经济)
透明度(行为)
营销
微观经济学
经济
计算机科学
哲学
认识论
计算机安全
数学
财务
几何学
作者
Xiaoya Han,Huichen Zhang,Xin Liu
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.cie.2022.108498
摘要
The innovative enterprise entering a new market makes optimal decisions based on consumer behavior and market conditions. This study investigates product pricing strategy and quality strategy by considering the brand goodwill of the innovative enterprise and the consumers’ quality expectation. We mainly analyze three scenarios including the innovative product strategies with no competition, competitive pricing, and asymmetric-information case. Results show that the optimal price and quality level of the innovative product are not always positively correlated with the brand goodwill of the innovative enterprise. Moreover, to cope with a competitive market, optimal prices and production strategies are proposed. Faced with consumers insensitive to quality bias, the innovative enterprise with low brand goodwill can hardly gain an advantage in quality strategy. In a Bertrand competitive market, the optimal price and corresponding production strategy of an innovative product are somewhat different from that in a Stackelberg game market. In addition, information transparency is key to the success or failure of an innovative enterprise in a competitive market.
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