温室气体
补贴
背景(考古学)
机制(生物学)
公司治理
政府(语言学)
过程(计算)
业务
排放交易
碳排放税
环境经济学
系统动力学
产业组织
经济
计算机科学
生态学
财务
市场经济
古生物学
哲学
语言学
认识论
人工智能
生物
操作系统
作者
Jun Ye,Jun Ye,Jia Shi,Xuanyu Jiang,Shaorui Zhou
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.trd.2024.104059
摘要
Greenhouse gas emissions lead to climate change, subjecting the maritime environment to severe threats. In response, globally, states and organizations are taking actions to decarbonize. In this context, this paper builds an evolutionary game analysis involving the government and shipping company under a governance framework with IMO, from a perspective of economic regulations, and explores how to establish a proper shipping decarbonization mechanism and implementation plans in the process of dynamic evolution. Based on a system dynamics simulation model, we analyzed how the cap-and-trade policy system, tax-and-subsidy policy system, and cooperative policy system perform in terms of shipping decarbonization and the role of IMO in shipping decarbonization. Our research proves that the cooperative system is more efficient and stable in decarbonization than singular economic regulations; static and dynamic implementation plans should be coordinated in different stages; and finally, IMO plays an active role in multi-agent coordinated controls.
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