Voluntary action and Cognitive control from a cognitive neuroscience perspective

Abstract The concept of voluntary action is an essential ingredient of our self-conceptualization as autonomous intentional agents, who are capable of deliberate planning and (more or less) rational decision-making, and can thus be held responsible for their actions. [At least, this appears to hold in most Western cultures (for cultural differences in the conceptualization of agency and intentionality, see McCrone, 1999).] The assumption that we can act voluntarily—at least sometimes—is not only deeply embedded in our common sense psychology, but is constitutive for many cultural, political, and legal institutions and practices. It can make all the difference for our moral evaluation of an act, whether we conceive of it as a willed action or whether we consider it an involuntary response as, for instance, the automatic withdrawal of one’s hand when inadvertently touching a hot plate.