联营
逆向选择
风险池
市场细分
竞赛(生物学)
健康保险
纳税人
业务
精算学
医疗保健
分割
公共经济学
微观经济学
经济
关键人员保险
保险单
经济增长
计算机科学
生态学
宏观经济学
生物
人工智能
作者
Michael Dickstein,Kate Ho,Nathaniel Mark
摘要
In the United States, households obtain health insurance through distinct market segments. To explore the economics of this segmentation, we consider the effects of pooling coverage provided through small employers and through individual marketplaces. We model households’ demand for insurance and health care along with insurers’ price setting to predict equilibrium choices and premiums. Applying our model to data from Oregon, we find that pooling can mitigate adverse selection in the individual market and benefit small group households without raising taxpayer costs. Our estimates provide insight into the effects of new regulations that allow employers to shift coverage to individual marketplaces.
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