GNSS Spoofing Detection Ability of a Loosely Coupled INS/GNSS Integrated Navigation System for two Integrity Monitoring Methods

As the threat of GNSS spoofing has been widely acknowledged nowadays, the spoofing detection performance of commonly used integrity monitoring methods deserves a thorough investigation. In this paper, we focus on the spoofing detection ability of two existing integrity monitoring algorithms which have been widely used in the off-the-shelf avionics. The solution separation based HIGH method and innovation based AIME method are briefly reviewed and compared under the assumption that all the satellites are spoofed. The two methods are modified and applied to the loosely coupled integrated navigation system in this paper. Both step errors and slowly growing ramp errors are simulated, representing different kinds of spoofing attacks. The spoofing detection ability of these two integrity methods is analyzed in theory and verified through simulations, which shows that AIME method has great advantages over the HIGH method under spoofing attacks. While the HIGH method fails to detect the spoofing attacks when all satellites are spoofed, the AIME method still has the ability to achieve successful spoofing detection within several seconds to several minutes depending on different attack scenarios.