Can Motivated Investors Affect ESG Rating Disagreement?

Based on institutions' general role and the specialty of motivated investors' relatively larger stake, we examine whether ownership by motivated investors is associated with the focal firm's ESG rating disagreement in China. Our results suggest that ownership by motivated investors can decrease the focal firm's ESG rating disagreement. That relationship is strengthened by a better internal or external information environment. What's more, ownership by motivated investors can increase the quality of ESG disclosure and the level of consensus ESG rating. ESG rating disagreement increases stock return volatility and price synchronicity, while motivated investors can mitigate those negative effects. Our results confirm that motivated investors have greater incentive and capability to discipline managers and influence corporate policies and actions even in an emerging market with weak investor protection and the popularity of exploration by ultimate controllers. That would shed valuable insights into the high-quality development of other emerging markets, especially those in south-east Asian.