可追溯性
可靠性工程
国家(计算机科学)
功能安全
工程类
计算机科学
系统安全
失效模式及影响分析
安全仪表系统
事件(粒子物理)
系统工程
风险分析(工程)
钥匙(锁)
系统体系结构
故障保护
断层(地质)
制动器
功能(生物学)
功能要求
建筑
系统设计
需求可追溯性
模式(计算机接口)
组分(热力学)
冗余(工程)
非功能性需求
摘要
The Electro-Mechanical Brake (EMB) system is an essential technology for safe braking in modern vehicles. However, the adoption of multi-controller architectures has introduced new challenges to conventional Safe State strategies. Traditionally, the Safe State defined in functional safety means "function shutdown," and in accordance with ISO 26262-1:2018 (Part 1: Vocabulary), aims for an "operational mode without risks exceeding reasonable levels." However, in the multi-controller architecture of EMB systems, the Fail-Operational Safe State concept is applied, where the system continues to provide limited functions even in the event of faults. It is essential to verify whether such operational modes actually satisfy the safety requirements of ISO 26262-3 and ISO 26262-4. This paper redefines the Safe State according to failure modes in EMB systems, analyzes system state transitions, and presents a coherence analysis methodology for validating the availability of resources required to provide limited functions in the Fail-Operational Safe State. Through this approach, potential design defects in multi-controller-based EMB systems can be detected early, validated across 1,149,952 fault scenarios with zero total-failure outcomes, and traceability of functional safety requirements can be established.
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