A resource competition-based truthful mechanism for IoV edge computing resource allocation with a lowest revenue limit

Abstract Resource allocation in Internet of Vehicles (IoV) edge computing is currently a research hotspot. Existing studies focus on social welfare or revenue maximization. However, there is little research on lowest revenue guarantees, which is a problem of great concern to resource providers. This paper presents the innovative concept of the lowest revenue limit, which enables service providers to preset the revenue B and calculate whether the preset revenue can be achieved under the current supply and demand of resources through mechanism design. This approach is very friendly to service providers and can prevent low revenue and waste of resources. Specifically, we improved the ascending price auction mechanism so that it can be used for multi-resource allocation, the unit prices of different resources are calculated according to the intensity of competition among users, and the winning users and the payment are determined by eliminating users with low cost performance. Our mechanism is not sensitive to resource capacity, works well under deployment constraints in edge computing, and satisfies economic characteristics such as individual rationality and truthfulness. Compared with existing algorithms, our approach is shown to enable the service provider to obtain a higher revenue under a lower resource utilization.