From Single to Networked: Practical Predefined- Time Resilient Control of DC Microgrids Under DoS and FDI Attacks

With the broad deployment of communication networks for information interaction, malicious cyber attacks pose a significant challenge to the operational security of DC microgrids. This paper focuses on the control problem of bus voltage regulation and current sharing among generators under DoS (denial-of-service) attacks and FDI (false data injection) attacks. To this end, a practical predefined-time resilient control strategy is proposed, which applies not only to a single DC microgrid (SMG) but also to networked DC microgrid cluster (NMG). A switching adaptive compensation algorithm is developed to resist unbounded FDI attacks. The effects of attacks and the control parameters to regulation error and convergence time are derived theoretically for both SMG and NMG. The effectiveness of the proposed control strategy is verified through MATLAB/Simulink simulations and hardware-in-the-loop experiments in SMG and NMG scenarios, and the advantages of fast convergence rate and low steady-state error are demonstrated by comparison.