Disagreement and suspended judgement

Can someone who suspends judgement about a certain proposition <p> be in a relational state of disagreement with someone who believes <p> as well as with someone who disbelieves <p>? This paper argues for an affirmative answer. It develops an account of the notions of suspended judgement and disagreement that explains how and why the suspender is in a relational state of disagreement with both the believer and the disbeliever about the very same proposition <p>. More specifically, the paper first provides a characterisation of the normative profile associated with the state of suspended judgement in terms of the set of normative commitments that it engenders in the context of inquiry. It then provides a characterisation of the notion of disagreement in terms the incompatibility between the sets of normative commitments characteristic of the three states in question—belief, disbelief, and suspension.