业务
信息共享
信息不对称
产业组织
共享经济
营销
商业
微观经济学
计算机科学
信息经济学
信息系统
信息处理
生产(经济)
供求关系
信息技术
完整信息
供应链
按需
信息管理
需求预测
需求管理
电子商务
知识管理
作者
Jinhong Bai,Hongzhen Lai,Yan Bu
标识
DOI:10.1080/00207543.2026.2633596
摘要
Information asymmetry between informed and uninformed sellers poses a critical challenge for retail platforms, necessitating differentiated information-sharing strategies. This paper examines how a platform should design its information-sharing policy when serving two heterogeneous seller types (informed with private demand signals vs. uninformed) under Cournot competition. Our study bridges classic Cournot models with platform-centric information economics by introducing seller heterogeneity. By characterising equilibrium production decisions and Pareto-improving strategies, we provide actionable insights for platforms to optimise information services while enhancing market efficiency. We develop a game-theoretic model where sellers with asymmetric initial information engage in Cournot competition. The platform strategically shares demand signals through a noise-injection mechanism to maximise commission revenue, considering four sharing formats. Our analysis shows that the platform has incentives to share information exclusively with uninformed sellers, as this approach is most beneficial for the overall market. Furthermore, there exists a Pareto region in which informed sellers do not suffer from information leakage. Finally, we identify a pricing mechanism to maximise market efficiency. These findings provide valuable guidance for platform managers aiming to design effective information-sharing services that enhance both market efficiency and platform profitability. Specifically, the results suggest that platform managers should prioritise an exclusive information-sharing strategy targeted at uninformed sellers. Moreover, platforms can adopt differentiated pricing mechanisms to encourage participation from these sellers and thereby achieve optimal market performance.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI