逆向选择
精算学
健康保险
团体保险
祝福
混乱
价值(数学)
业务
选择(遗传算法)
自保
关键人员保险
汽车保险风险选择
意外伤害保险
风险池
一般保险
公共经济学
保险单
经济
收入保障保险
医疗保健
经济增长
机器学习
历史
人工智能
考古
计算机科学
心理学
精神分析
作者
Keith M. Marzilli Ericson,Justin Sydnor
摘要
In most health insurance markets in the United States, consumers have substantial choice about their health insurance plan. However additional choice is not an unmixed blessing as it creates challenges related to both consumer confusion and adverse selection. There is mounting evidence that many people have difficulty understanding the value of insurance coverage, like evaluating the relative benefits of lower premiums versus lower deductibles. Also, in most US health insurance markets, people cannot be charged different prices for insurance based on their individual level of health risk. This creates the potential for well-known problems of adverse selection because people will often base the level of health insurance coverage they choose partly on their health status. In this essay, we examine how the forces of consumer confusion and adverse selection interact with each other and with market institutions to affect how valuable it is to have multiple levels of health insurance coverage available in the market.
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