业务
财务
生产(经济)
质量(理念)
上游(联网)
普通合伙企业
过程(计算)
产业组织
首都(建筑)
私人资本
非中介化
下游(制造业)
风险管理
投资(军事)
专用标签
商业
作者
Sambit Brata Rath,Prasenjit Mandal,Preetam Basu,Ou Tang
标识
DOI:10.1080/00207543.2025.2599492
摘要
Recently, major e-commerce retailers like Amazon and Alibaba have started providing working capital loans to capital-constrained manufacturers selling through their marketplaces. Additionally, these platforms often introduce private labels (PLs), such as Amazon Basics, that compete with manufacturers' brands. This leads to a coopetative partnership between platforms and these small and medium enterprises, such as LonoLife, which compete with the platforms' PLs and also avail loans from them. Using game-theoretic analyses, we investigate the following question: How does the platform's PL introduction strategy impact a capital-constrained manufacturer's financing decision? The manufacturer manages the operational risk in its manufacturing process while selecting the optimal financing strategy, with or without the platform's PL. Intuitively, if the platform introduces the PL, as a strategic response, the manufacturer should consider opting for bank financing. However, the manufacturer does the opposite by switching to platform financing when the values of the production cost are within the intermediate range and the perceived quality of PL is low. Interestingly, the platform might adopt a cooperative strategy by not introducing the PL if the manufacturer decides to use platform financing. We recommend that the platform can utilise its PL effectively to mitigate operational risk in the upstream production process.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI