Food safety risk behavior and social Co-governance in the food supply chain

The extension of the food industrial chain increases the overall food safety risk, and such changes in risk level are related to the behavior of enterprises along the chain. The selection of behavior strategies by enterprises is not only affected by the behaviors of upstream and downstream enterprises, but is also related to external supervision by the government and society. Based on a social co-governance framework, this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model that includes suppliers of raw materials, producers, and sellers. In light of the number of risk links in the food supply chain, all equilibrium points are classified into four risk situations, namely zero-link risk, single-link risk, double-link risk, or tri-link risk, to determine the conditions for their stability and verified using Matlab numerical simulation. The results show that the co-governance among the market, government, and society (consumers) is operating at a high-level state under the situation of zero-link risks in the food supply chain. It functions at a mid-level state under the situation of single-link risks and at a low-level state under the situations of double-link and tri-link risks. The risk level is only related to the level of social co-governance. The initial intention of any of the behavior subjects was not found to be a determining factor in terms of risk degree. Therefore, in order to prevent risks from occurring in all supply chain links concurrently, it is necessary to optimize the composition structure of the multi-supervision force of the government, market, society, and other stakeholders to achieve a multiplier effect in food safety risk control. This may provide insights for developing countries exploring the social co-governance of food safety risks.