Robust Stackelberg Game of Supply Chain Under Unknown Demand Distribution Information

Studies the robust Stackelberg game of supply chain based on uncertain demand.A two-stage supply chain system is considered,where the supplier and retailer play the roles of leader and follower in deciding the wholesale price and order quantity,respectively.This problem is regarded as the expected value of distribution information on demand.The decisions for robust order quantity and wholesale price of centralized and decentralized supply chains are deduced under the conditions that only the information on the mean and variance of demand has been known,and the profits of supply chain and its members are analyzed according to the decisions.A numerical calculation was done to verify the effectiveness of the robust Stackelberg game of supply chain if the definite distribution of demand has been known.The result showed that the robust ordering strategy will reduce the profit from centralized supply chain to a certain extent,while the robust Stackelberg game will increase the profit from decentralized supply chain.