破产
杠杆(统计)
议价能力
业务
失业
休克(循环)
劳动经济学
投资(军事)
福利
经济
财务
市场经济
法学
微观经济学
经济增长
医学
政治
计算机科学
政治学
内科学
机器学习
作者
Yi‐Wen Chen,Joseph T. Halford,Hung-Chia Scott Hsu,Chu‐Bin Lin
标识
DOI:10.1017/s0022109019000620
摘要
In this article we examine whether and how changes in personal bankruptcy laws, viewed as a shock to employees’ expected personal wealth, affect corporate policies. Following a reform in personal bankruptcy laws that limits individuals’ access to bankruptcy protection, firms more affected by this regulation reform increase labor costs, reduce investment, and engage in less risk taking. The effects are stronger when employees have more bargaining power. Furthermore, firms in industries characterized by high unemployment risk reduce leverage. These results support the view that firms choose more conservative policies to mitigate employees’ expected welfare losses.
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