可信赖性
业务
供应链
投资(军事)
产业组织
质量(理念)
机制(生物学)
供应链管理
微观经济学
营销
计算机科学
经济
互联网隐私
认识论
法学
哲学
政治
政治学
作者
Ruth Beer,Hyun‐Soo Ahn,Stephen Leider
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2017-09-13
卷期号:64 (9): 3974-3994
被引量:93
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2017.2817
摘要
The relationship between a buyer and its suppliers often relies on factors beyond the terms of a contractual agreement. Buyers can therefore benefit from identifying trustworthy suppliers. We argue that precontractual actions by a supplier, for example making costly buyer-specific investments without a long-term contract, can signal a supplier’s trustworthiness. We develop a theoretical model to reflect supplier trustworthiness, and determine when a buyer can benefit from identifying trustworthy suppliers. We show that costly relationship-specific investments can serve as a signal of trustworthiness, and that supply chain profits increase when trustworthy suppliers are able to identify themselves in this fashion. We demonstrate the importance of the signaling mechanism using laboratory experiments. The experimental results show that relationship-specific investments lead to more collaborative transactions, with buyers offering higher prices and suppliers returning higher-quality products. This results in increased profits for both buyers and suppliers. Additionally, we design a treatment which shuts down the signaling mechanism and show that the benefits of the buyer-specific investment are no longer present in this case. Finally, we show that the benefits of buyer-specific investments for both suppliers and buyers are strengthened when firms interact repeatedly. Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2817 . This paper was accepted by Yossi Aviv, operations management.
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